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YOU’RE OBJECTING TO ME?: CHALLENGING JUDICIAL
QUESTIONING
Matthew E. Christoph & Benjamin K. Golden
INTRODUCTION
You represent a young man who was attacked by a black bear in a
state park. After finishing your client’s direct examination, opposing
counsel’s cross-examination proves ineffective. You rise to rest your
case, and the fatal moment occurs. The judge leans in:
JUDGE: You were celebrating at the park by yourself?
WITNESS: Yes. I’d just been accepted to graduate school.
The judge’s question seems like a harmless point of clarification,
but you sense it is not over. Fear overcomes you as you remain seated.
Your client looks at you, confused.
JUDGE: Were you drinking?
WITNESS: No, not that evening.
JUDGE: How often do you drink? Were you prescribed any
psychiatric medications?
WITNESS: Um . . .
JUDGE: Answer the question.
You recognize a number of possible objections here. But do you
dare ruffle the judge’s feathers when you feel like the jury is on your
side? After all, you want to show that your client has nothing to hide.
So, what do you do?
In this Article, we examine the often seen and routinely
unchallenged practice of judicial questioning. In Part I, we discuss the
fundamental concept of judicial impartiality and the power of judges to
question witnesses. In Part II, we will illustrate varied examples from
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both civil and criminal trials where judges crossed (or may have crossed)
the line in questioning witnesses. In Part III, we consider what trial
counsel should do in the face of improper judicial questioning. In Part
IV, we explain how the failure to object to questioning significantly
diminishes the likelihood of success on appeal. In the Conclusion, we
urge counsel to object whenever a judge’s questions appear likely to
endanger their clients’ rights.
I.

JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY AND THE POWER OF JUDGES TO
QUESTION WITNESSES

A fundamental tenet of the law is the concept of judicial
impartiality.1 The promise of an unbiased judge rests at the heart of the
very notion of a fair trial for any party walking into a courthouse’s
ominous halls. Indeed, the Constitution of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts emphatically guarantees “the right of every citizen to be
tried by judges as free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity
will admit.”2 The Supreme Judicial Court has held that “rigid adherence
to [this] principle is essential to the maintenance of free institutions.”3

1. See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954) (“[J]ustice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.”); see also Aharon Barak, Foreword, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a
Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 19, 54 (2002) (“Independence of the
judiciary means, first and foremost, that in judging, the judge is subject to nothing other than
the law.”); L. Wildhaber, Judicial Impartiality Under the European Convention on Human
Rights, CONST. COURT REPUBLIC ARM., http://www.concourt.am/armenian/con_right/2.122001/wildhaber-eng.htm [https://perma.cc/MSE2-BAZD] (“Impartiality lies at the very heart
of the notion of justice and fair trial.”); Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the
Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when Parties
Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 423, 426 (2004) (“Without such [judicial] neutrality, the entire legitimacy of the legal
system, indeed its reason for existence within the democratic experiment, fall[s].”). See
generally Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV.
493 (2013) (providing comprehensive discussion of judicial impartiality).
2. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XXIX; see also King v. Grace, 200 N.E. 346, 348 (Mass.
1936) (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XI).
[Article 29] is essential to the end that “Every subject of the commonwealth ought
to find a certain remedy, by having recourse to the laws, for all injuries or wrongs
which he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain
right and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it; completely, and
without any denial; promptly, and without delay; conformably to the laws.”
Id.; Whitney v. Wellesley & Boston St. Ry. Co., 84 N.E. 95, 95–96 (Mass. 1908) (“[T]he
judge who discharges the functions of his office, is under the statute, as well as at common
law, the directing and controlling mind at the trial, and not a mere functionary to preserve
order, and lend ceremonial dignity to the proceedings.”).
3. Commonwealth v. Leventhal, 307 N.E.2d 839, 841 (Mass. 1974) (quoting
Thomajanian v. Odabshian, 172 N.E. 232, 233 (Mass. 1930)).

2018]

CHALLENGING JUDICIAL QUESTIONING

45

Importantly, it is also undisputed that judges—in both civil and
criminal trials, in and out of the presence of juries—may play an active
role in the proceedings.4 “A trial judge ‘need take no vow of silence.
He is there to see that justice is done or at least to see that the jury have a
fair chance to do justice.’”5 As “the guiding spirit and controlling mind
at a trial,” there is no doubt that a judge has the power to question
witnesses.6 In Commonwealth v. Festa, the Supreme Judicial Court
acknowledged that trial judges may question witnesses to clarify
evidence, eradicate inconsistencies, avert possible perjury, and develop

4. See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 647 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Mass. 1995) (concluding trial
judge’s interruptions did not prejudice defendant where they were an attempt to assist the
defendant by explaining how to show that witness made a prior inconsistent statement, and
judge correctly excluded or curtailed repetitive, argumentative, and improperly phrased
questions); Commonwealth v. Dias, 367 N.E.2d 623, 626 (Mass. 1977) (finding no error
because the trial judge’s questioning was meant to draw out additional material facts, not
coerce a retraction by the witness); Commonwealth v. Haley, 296 N.E.2d 207, 210–11 (Mass.
1973) (noting judge may exclude evidence sua sponte); Commonwealth v. Oates, 99 N.E.2d
460, 461 (Mass. 1951) (affirming rape conviction where judge’s examination was done merely
to clarify the purpose of admitting the defendant’s jacket into evidence); Adoption of Seth,
560 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (reasoning that the judge’s “extraordinary”
questioning was not prompted by bias, but rather his impatience with counsel’s inability to
properly pose questions); Griffith v. Griffith, 509 N.E.2d 38, 39–40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)
(finding that, where self-represented litigant tended to stray into considerations not legally
relevant, judge was warranted in attempting to narrow the issues, asking questions, and
directing the course of trial).
5. Dias, 367 N.E.2d at 626 (quoting Haley, 296 N.E.2d at 211); cf. Gauntlett v. Med.
Parameters, Inc., 405 N.E.2d 1003, 1003–04 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (reversing lower court’s
decision and holding judge’s comments were inconsistent with the judge’s role as an impartial
magistrate and that the judge’s discretion is not unbridled); Francis Bacon, Of Judicature, in
ESSAYS, CIVIL AND MORAL: THE HARVARD CLASSICS 130 (Charles W. Eliot, ed., 1909)
(“Patience and gravity of hearing is an essential part of justice; and an overspeaking judge is
no well-tuned cymbal. It is no grace to a judge first to find that which he might have heard in
due time from the bar.”). Compare Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G.
Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the
United States analogizing a judge to a baseball umpire), with Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040,
1045 (1st Cir. 1997) (“It is well-established that a judge is not a mere umpire; he is ‘the
governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct,’ and has a perfect right—
albeit a right that should be exercised with care—to participate actively in the trial proper.”)
(quoting Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933)).
6. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 353 N.E.2d 740, 744–45 (Mass. 1976) (quoting
Goldman v. Ashkins, 165 N.E. 513, 516 (1929)); Whitney, 84 N.E. at 96 (“the judge
[is] . . . the directing and controlling mind at the trial”); see also Commonwealth v. Festa, 341
N.E.2d 276, 279 (Mass. 1975) (“There is no doubt that a judge can properly question a
witness, albeit some of the answers may tend to reinforce the Commonwealth’s case, so long
as the examination is not partisan in nature, biased, or a display of belief in the defendant’s
guilt.”).
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trustworthy testimony.7
Trial judges are not required to remain silent, but are tasked with
shepherding the proceedings to ensure justice is done with efficiency and
expediency.8 Judges may even order parties to take depositions or call
any witness as the “court’s witness,” even when no party has called
them.9 Claims of judicial error are evaluated under a “rule of reason,”
and “[m]uch depends on the nature of the proceeding.”10 But there are

7. See 341 N.E.2d at 279; see also Dias, 367 N.E.2d at 626–27; MASS. G. EVID.
§ 614(a) (2017) (providing judicial right to call witnesses); United States v. McColgin, 535
F.2d 471, 474–75 (8th Cir. 1976) (finding no prejudice where trial court attempted to clarify
witness testimony); United States v. Burch, 471 F.2d 1314, 1317–18 (6th Cir. 1973) (finding
no abuse of discretion where judicial question is to elicit more information and clarify
questions); Oates, 99 N.E.2d at 461 (finding no error where judicial question was not bias);
Seth, 560 N.E.2d. at 712 (finding no prejudice where judicial examination was to expedite and
clarify); Griffith, 509 N.E.2d at 39–40 (finding that judicial examination was warranted to
narrow the triable issues).
8. See Dias, 367 N.E.2d at 626 (finding that judge’s questioning was intended to elicit
additional material facts); Oates, 99 N.E.2d at 460–61 (noting judge’s examination done
merely to clarify evidence); Seth, 560 N.E.2d at 712 (noting judge’s “extraordinary”
questioning not prompted by bias, but rather his impatience with counsel’s inability to
properly pose questions); Griffith, 509 N.E.2d at 39–40 (finding judge warranted in attempting
to narrow the issues, ask questions, and direct the course of trial).
9. MASS. G. EVID. § 614(a) (2017) (“When necessary in the interest of justice, the court
may call a witness on its own or at a party’s request. Each party is entitled to cross-examine
the witness.”); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2484, at 276 (Chadbourn ed. 1981) (“[T]he general
judicial power . . . implies inherently a power to investigate as auxiliary to the power to
decide; and the power to investigate implies necessarily a power to summon and to question
witnesses.”); see also Quincy Trust Co. v. Taylor, 57 N.E.2d 573, 575 (Mass. 1944).
Where a court has once taken jurisdiction and has become responsible to the
public for the exercise of its judicial power so as to do justice, it is sometimes the
right and even the duty of the court to act in some particular sua sponte. . . . A
judge may call a witness, put questions to a witness, or refresh his judicial
knowledge of a fact, even against the protest of the parties.
Id.; McLaughlin v. Mun. Ct. of Roxbury, 32 N.E.2d 266, 268, 270–72 (Mass. 1941) (affirming
decision of judge who ordered defendant to testify during small claims proceeding); Morgan
v. Jozus, 851 N.E.2d 1080, 1084–87 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (noting trial judge may sua sponte
vacate ambiguous interlocutory decree).
10. Campbell, 353 N.E.2d at 744 (“We discern no error in the action of the judge in
this instance and suggest only that the rule of reason on how much a judge should move into
the interrogation of witnesses in the light of the foregoing stated law will undoubtedly be
followed by most judges.”). Unfortunately, “there is no quantitative test [to] determin[e]
whether a judge has gone beyond the bounds [] the law imposes.” Judicial Guidelines for
Civil Hearings Involving Self-Represented Litigants, in BEST PRACTICES IN MANAGING SELFREPRESENTED LITIGATION: GUIDELINES, STRATEGIES, AND BENCH SKILLS Tab 1, 14 (Mar.
30,
2012),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_atj_best_practices_in_managing_srl_toc.authcheckda
m.pdf [https://perma.cc/2CLF-VTK6].
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still lines a trial judge may not cross.11 A judge may not engage in
questioning that is “partisan in nature, biased, or [that demonstrates]
belief in the defendant’s guilt.”12 Moreover, it is well established that in
Massachusetts, “[a] judge who takes a case that he does not understand
out of the hands of competent counsel who do understand it, is a
nuisance.”13 These are the types of transgressions that are the focus of
this Article.
II.

EXAMPLES OF (POSSIBLE) IMPROPER QUESTIONING

A. Commonwealth v. Ragonesi
In Commonwealth v. Ragonesi, during a pre-trial hearing, the judge
“took the bit in his teeth” and cross-examined an alleged sexual assault
victim for twenty-three pages of transcript.14 The judge’s inquiry delved
into the most trivial details of the alleged sexual acts.15
The Appeals Court described the judge’s questioning as “both
excessive and inexcusable,” resulting in a “thoroughly coerced witness
who would be understandably reluctant to go back on the sworn
testimony she had given to a judge of the Superior Court.”16 Noting that
the questioning occurred at a pre-trial hearing, the court concluded that
“there was no practical way in which the trial judge could alleviate the
hidden damage by curative instructions such as are customarily given
whenever there is a possibility that he (the trial judge) may have gone

11. See MASS. G. EVID. § 614 (2017); FED. R. EVID. 614(b); Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d
1040, 1045 (1st Cir. 1997) (“It is well-established that a judge is not a mere umpire; he is ‘the
governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct,’ and has a perfect right—
albeit a right that should be exercised with care—to participate actively in the trial proper.”);
Commonwealth v. Haley, 296 N.E.2d 207, 211 (Mass. 1973) (“A judge who takes a case that
he does not understand out of the hands of competent counsel who do understand it, is a
nuisance. The judge must never become or appear to be a partisan.”).
12. Commonwealth v. Festa, 341 N.E.2d 276, 279 (Mass. 1975); see SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT RULE 3:09: CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Preamble (2015); see also
Commonwealth v. Hassey, 668 N.E.2d 357, 357–58 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996) (finding that judge
exceeded the limits on judicial questioning and it was too partisan); Commonwealth v.
Ragonesi, 493 N.E.2d 527, 529–30 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (noting judicial questioning
“excessive and inexcusable” where judicial question consumed twenty-three pages of
transcript).
13. Haley, 296 N.E.2d at 211.
14. 493 N.E.2d at 529.
15. For more details on the questions asked, see id. at 531–33. Please note, the
transcript includes triggering topics such as violence against women and sexually graphic
language.
16. Id. at 530.
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too far in questioning a witness.”17 Given the motion judge’s
inexcusable questioning, the Appeals Court reversed the defendant’s
convictions.18
B. Adoption of Norbert
In Adoption of Norbert, the court discussed a case where the trial
judge asked more than 1000 questions during a termination of parental
rights trial—nearly 300 more than the total number of questions asked
by all trial counsel combined.19 While child welfare cases are tried
before a sole trier of fact in the judge, such questioning and counsel’s
conduct surrounding the same remain essential to their client’s case on
appeal. Below is but a small portion of the judge’s cross-examination of
the mother:
THE COURT: So you missed eight visits with the child? . . . Do you
think that had any impact on the child?
THE WITNESS: I’m sure it did at that point.
THE COURT: What kind of impact—do you think that it had a lasting
impact?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: What kind of impact do you think it had on the child?
THE WITNESS: Not a very good one. I felt bad for him every day,
you know.
THE COURT: So do you acknowledge, then, that it was harmful for
the child not to see you for those eight months?20
On appeal, the mother argued that the judge had “impermissibly
interfered with the conduct of the trial” and thus “denied her the
impartial justice to which she [was] entitled.”21 Although the Appeals
Court rejected the mother’s argument, it agreed that “the judge’s
questioning went beyond clarification and delved into substantive areas
that would have best been left to the attorneys to develop.”22 In her
dissent, Justice Hanlon explained that while “it is often necessary for a

17. Id.
18. Id. at 531.
19. 986 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013). The court noted the same trial judge
had previously engaged in extensive questioning of witnesses and specifically cited Adoption
of Nurit, No. 07-P-8161104, 2008 WL 170389 (Mass. App. Ct. Jan. 18, 2008).
20. Id. at 893 (Hanlon J., dissenting). The judge proceeded to cross-examine the
mother, “virtually uninterrupted, for [another] twelve pages of transcript.” Id. (Hanlon J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 891.
22. Id.
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trial judge to ask questions in order to elicit crucial information”—a
point that is “particularly true in a case where the safety of children is at
stake”—the judge’s questioning of the mother was improper because it
did “not seem designed to seek information.”23 Rather, the judge’s
questioning displayed the character of “an effective cross-examination
by a skillful adversary.”24 As discussed below, each improper question
should have been meaningfully objected to and counsel should have
preserved the record for appeal.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that “[j]ustice must
satisfy the appearance of justice,” mandating that attorneys and judges
mutually keep each other in check.25 As explained in Part IV below,
Massachusetts courts have warned that, in civil cases, issues not raised
by a losing party in the trial court generally will not be considered on
appeal, absent exceptional circumstances.26 In Norbert, despite the
judge’s extensive questioning, the Appeals Court affirmed the lower
court’s decision, in part due to counsel’s silence.27
III.

HOW TO RESPOND TO IMPROPER JUDICIAL QUESTIONING

Some readers may understandably ask whether objecting to a trial
judge’s questions may do their clients more harm than good. What if the
judge interprets the objection as an ad hominem attack? What if the
judge subconsciously rules against the client because of animosity
toward the attorney? These concerns—whatever their merit—do not
excuse counsel’s failure to object in the face of improper judicial

23. Id. at 892 (Hanlon J., dissenting).
24. Id.
25. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 13 (1954) (“The vital point is that in sitting in
judgment on such a misbehaving lawyer the judge should not himself give vent to personal
spleen or respond to a personal grievance. These are subtle matters, for they concern the
ingredients of what constitutes justice.”). See generally JOHN PAUL RYAN ET AL., AMERICAN
TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK STYLES AND PERFORMANCE (1980) (providing comprehensive
analysis of judicial behavior); Peter David Blanck, The Appearance of Justice Revisited, 86 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 887 (1996) (offering a careful study examining the notion of the
appearance of justice throughout American history).
26. See, e.g., McNamara v. Honeyman, 546 N.E.2d 139, 145 (Mass. 1989) (finding that
where unlawful constitutional Fourth Amendment argument was not raised at trial, appeals
court will not hear); Palmer v. Murphy, 677 N.E.2d 247, 251 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997)
(“Objections, issues, or claims—however meritorious—that have not been raised at the trial
level are deemed generally to have been waived on appeal.”); Darling v. Pinkham, 402 N.E.2d
115, 116 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (holding that appeals court will not hear claim brought for
first time in appellate court); see also infra Part IV and cases cited.
27. See Norbert, 986 N.E.2d at 891–92.
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questioning.28
While “[m]uch depends on the nature of the
proceeding,”29 the Supreme Judicial Court has recognized that an
attorney’s duty to protect a client’s rights will sometimes require an
attorney to object to a judge’s questions.30 The Appeals Court has
explained that “[o]bjections posed to the trial judge do not reflect
personal disagreement, but are manifestations of respect.”31 Finally, an
attorney owes their client an undivided and unflinching duty of loyalty,
which necessarily includes the obligation to object to questioning that
may harm their client’s interest.32
However, there are certain key principles for counsel to remember
when deciding whether and how to object to a judge’s questions. First,
counsel’s “obligation” to make timely objections is the same in both jury
and jury-waived trials.33 Second, while courts have suggested that
28. See Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 406 N.E.2d 389, 396 (Mass. 1980) (noting “the
delicate problem that objections to a judge’s actions present to defense counsel”);
Commonwealth v. Watkins, 823 N.E.2d 404, 406–07 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (affirming
counsel has the same duty to object to improper questions from a judge as when questions are
asked by opposing counsel). Generally, counsel should make an objection to a question
before the answer is given. See also Commonwealth v. Marshall, 749 N.E.2d 147, 155 (Mass.
2001) (“When objecting, counsel should state the specific ground of the objection unless it is
apparent from the context.”) (internal citation omitted); Mains v. Commonwealth, 739 N.E.2d
1125, 1129–30 (Mass. 2000) (noting self-represented litigants are bound by the same rules of
procedure as litigants with counsel). Examples of attorneys suffering before judges who have
lost their patience are often comedic, but only when viewed from the safe security of the
periphery. For instance, one Nevada-based attorney arrived fifteen minutes late to court and
the judge’s opinion was unsparing: “Were there ever a time to use ‘fail,’ as the contemporary
vernacular permits, it is now, and in reference to this deplorable display of legal
representation: it was an epic fail.” In re Spickelmier, 469 B.R. 903, 906 (Bankr. D. Nev.
2012) (emphasis added).
29. Commonwealth v. Campbell, 353 N.E.2d 740, 744 (Mass. 1976).
30. Fitzgerald, 406 N.E.2d at 395; see also supra note 28 and cases cited.
31. See Watkins, 823 N.E.2d at 407.
32. See Bartle v. Berry, 953 N.E.2d 243, 249 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (“There is no
question that an attorney owes a duty of undivided loyalty to his client.”); see also Herbert A.
Sullivan, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 788 N.E.2d 522, 539–41 (Mass. 2003); Pollock v.
Marshall, 462 N.E.2d 312, 319–20 (Mass. 1984) (“That ‘[u]nflinching fidelity to their genuine
interests is the duty of every attorney to his clients’ is beyond question.”) (quoting Berman v.
Coakley, 137 N.E. 667, 670 (Mass. 1923)); MASS. R. PROF’L. CONDUCT r. 1.2–1.3, cmt. 1
(2015).
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition,
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and
ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer
must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.
MASS. R. PROF’L. CONDUCT r. 1.3, cmt. 1 (2015).
33. See Watkins, 823 N.E.2d at 406–08 (noting obligation to make timely objections is
the same in jury-waived and jury trials, but objections to judicial questioning in jury trials
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counsel need not make “repeated objections,”34 best practice dictates that
counsel should be steadfast in standing each time an objection is
warranted.35 Third, counsel must be sure to “state the specific ground of
the objection unless it is apparent from the context.”36 Fourth, counsel
should describe the judge’s tone and manner of asking questions.37
Finally, counsel should ask the judge to explain the reason for the
questioning that counsel finds objectionable. In many cases, the judge

should be made outside the jury’s hearing); see also William D. Kuester, Comment, Waiver of
Objection by Trial Conduct, 42 NEB. L. REV. 807, 808–10 (1963) (noting that lawyers must
object “to all technically inadmissible evidence” or run the risk of having similarly
inadmissible evidence admitted and have a cumulative adverse effect to his case).
34. Compare Kuczynski v. Alfano, 520 N.E.2d 150, 150 (Mass. 1988) (“The plaintiff’s
failure to make repeated objections to the judge’s conduct is not fatal on appeal. A litigant is
not forced to choose between minimizing the effect of improper judicial conduct at trial and
preserving full and thorough review.”), and Commonwealth v. Ragonesi, 493 N.E.2d 527, 529
n.4 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (“[T]he judge would not have tolerated any further objection from
the defendant. . . . If there were any question about the failure to object, we would overlook
it.”), with Fitzgerald, 406 N.E.2d at 396 (“[T]he total absence of any objection from
experienced defense counsel cannot be ignored in our attempt to determine the collective
effect of comments and questions from the judge.”).
35. If a timely objection is not made, the evidence is properly admitted, and the fact
finder is entitled to give it such probative effect as it deems appropriate. But any statement at
trial “is only worth what it is worth.” Commonwealth v. Drapaniotis, 48 N.E.3d 45, 50–51
(Mass. App. Ct. 2016); Commonwealth v. Miskel, 308 N.E.2d 547, 553–54 (Mass. 1974)
(holding reliance on “continuous objection” improper; “[t]he objection and exception to the
earlier question do not carry over to the later one to which there was no objection.”); see also
Commonwealth v. Grady, 54 N.E.3d 22, 28–29 (Mass. 2016) (“Where the better practice is for
a defendant to object at trial regardless of a motion in limine, any implication that a
defendant’s rights are being ‘preserved’ may inadvertently lead to just the opposite.”);
Freyermuth v. Lutfy, 382 N.E.2d 1059, 1063 (Mass. 1978) (“The consequence of the failure to
object is to waive the objection to the testimony.”); Commonwealth v. Julien, 797 N.E.2d 470,
477 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (noting in absence of objection, hearsay testimony is properly
admitted, and the jury is “entitled to give [the statement] such probative effect as they deem[]
appropriate.”); CBI Partners Ltd. P’ship v. Town of Chatham, 671 N.E.2d 523, 526 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1996) (illustrating pitfalls of a “continuing objection” where objection lacked
specificity “to raise squarely any possible infirmities in the foundation for testimony at trial,”
thus appellant “may not raise this issue for the first time on appeal.”).
36. Commonwealth v. Marshall, 749 N.E.2d 147, 155 (Mass. 2001) (quoting P.J.
LIACOS, MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE § 3.8.3, at 85 (7th ed. 1999)); Commonwealth v.
Perryman, 770 N.E.2d 1, 5 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (“[O]bjections to evidence, or to any
challenged order or ruling of the trial judge, are not preserved for appeal unless made in a
precise and timely fashion, as soon as the claimed error is apparent.”); see also MASS. R. CIV.
P. 46; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 22.
37. See Fitzgerald, 406 N.E.2d at 395 (“Because the transcript cannot disclose the tone
of a judge’s voice or his manner in making comments or asking questions, appellate judges are
not always able to assess the impact of a judge’s action.”); In re Adoption of Norbert, 986
N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (“Because the transcript cannot disclose the tone of
the judge’s voice or his manner in asking questions, it is difficult for us to assess the mother’s
claim that the judge acted aggressively toward her.”).
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may not realize why counsel would have cause to object, and counsel
may not realize why the judge believes the questioning is necessary or
proper. Honest dialogue—at sidebar if a jury is present—is the best way
to ensure that both the judge and counsel’s motivations are recorded and
understood, and that the judge has a fair opportunity to cure the error that
counsel finds objectionable.
We believe counsel who abides by these principles will gain the
respect of the judges they appear in front of, and will fulfill their
obligation to defend and protect the rights of their clients.
IV.

LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON APPEAL

When a judge commits error in the questioning of a witness, the
likelihood of success on appeal depends heavily on whether a timely
objection was made at trial.38 In many cases, the presence or absence of
an objection may be outcome-determinative.
Where counsel properly objects at trial, the appellate court will
review to determine whether the error was “harmless” or “prejudicial.”39
An error is non-prejudicial if it “did not influence the jury, or had but
very slight effect.”40 Where counsel fails to properly object at trial, the
appropriate standard of review depends on whether the error occurred in
a civil or criminal case. In a civil case, the appellate court generally will
deem the error waived, but may review to determine whether the error
was harmless.41 In a criminal case, the appellate court will review the
38. See supra note 28 and cases cited.
39. See Commonwealth v. Sylvester, 448 N.E.2d 1106, 1107 (Mass. 1983) (holding
“judge’s comments” were not “so prejudicial as to deny the defendant a fair trial.”);
Commonwealth v. Sneed, 383 N.E.2d 843, 846 (Mass. 1978) (concluding “words of the judge,
in total, could hardly have had anything other than a prejudicial effect on the jury”);
Commonwealth v. Festa, 341 N.E.2d 276, 279–80 (Mass. 1976) (“[E]ven if the judge was
overzealous in the manner in which he interrogated the witness,” the judge’s questioning was
“at most harmless error” and “not comparable to judicial interventions which have been held
to be so prejudicial to the defendant as to constitute reversible error.”).
It was error on the part of the judge to have conducted the examination because an
insufficient basis had been established for it and because the examination
exceeded what are generally the limits for judicial intervention in the questioning
of witnesses. In the context of the entire record of the trial, we do not think the
error was harmless and we, therefore, reverse the defendant’s conviction of rape.
Commonwealth v. Hassey, 668 N.E.2d 357, 357–58 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
40. Commonwealth v. Flebotte, 630 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Mass. 1994). The Supreme
Judicial Court has noted that the “possibility of prejudice [from improper judicial questioning]
arises especially in a criminal case where the judge’s questions may unintentionally have the
effect of impeaching the defendant or defense witnesses.” Fitzgerald, 406 N.E.2d at 389.
41. Palmer v. Murphy, 677 N.E.2d 247, 251 (Mass. App. Ct. 1997); Adoption of Seth,
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error to determine whether it created a “substantial risk of a miscarriage
of justice”42 (or a “substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice” in a
first-degree murder case43). A substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice
exists when there is “serious doubt whether the result of the trial might
have been different had the error not been made,” i.e., there is
uncertainty about whether the defendant’s guilt was fairly adjudicated.44
“Errors of this magnitude are extraordinary events and relief is seldom
granted.”45
A. Commonwealth v. Hassey
In Commonwealth v. Hassey, the defendant was convicted of rape
after the trial judge launched into a “penetrating examination” of a
defense witness who had not immediately gone to the police with
exculpatory information about the defendant.46 Over defense counsel’s
objection, the judge questioned the witness as follows:
THE COURT: I have a couple of questions, Mr. Spurrell. You have
been friendly with this defendant for ten or twelve years; is that right?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: He’s one of your best friends?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: When you learned he was accused of—when did you
learn he was accused of rape?
THE WITNESS: I think it was August. I hadn’t seen him for a while.
THE COURT: Did you go to see him right away after that?
THE WITNESS: He was in prison.
THE COURT: Well, did you get in any contact with him?

560 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (stating that, despite counsel’s failure to object,
even if the judge was “overzealous in becoming so involved [in questioning the psychiatrist],
the error was harmless in view of our conclusion, set forth below, that no prejudice resulted
from the testimony of the psychiatrist.”).
42. Commonwealth v. Gomes, 763 N.E.2d 83, 86 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002). For a
comprehensive discussion of the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard, compare
the majority and concurring opinions in Commonwealth v. Alphas, 712 N.E.2d 575, 579–81,
(Mass. 1999).
43. Commonwealth v. Paradise, 539 N.E.2d 1006, 1016 (Mass. 1989).
44. Commonwealth v. Randolph, 780 N.E.2d 58, 66 (Mass. 2002) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Azar, 760 N.E.2d 1224, 1234 (Mass. 2002)).
45. Id. at 67. Compare Commonwealth v. Smith, 951 N.E.2d 322, 327 n.2 (Mass.
2011) (“The substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice standard . . . we have said is
more forgiving to a defendant than the substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard
applicable in other criminal cases.”).
46. 668 N.E.2d 357, 359 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
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THE WITNESS: No, I didn’t.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, may we be heard.
THE COURT: Have you been in contact with him since that time?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: When did you get in contact with him for the first
time?
THE WITNESS: Probably two or three weeks after he was released on
bail.
THE COURT: And when was that?
THE WITNESS: I don’t recall the date.
THE COURT: Well, did you talk with him about this serious charge?
THE WITNESS: He told me what he was being charged with here.
THE COURT: You heard about what he was being charged with
before he told you?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: And what did you do when you heard about that
charge?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, your Honor.
THE WITNESS: Nothing.
THE COURT: You didn’t do a thing?
THE WITNESS: No, I didn’t.
THE COURT: You didn’t go down to the Hull Police Department and
say, My [sic] friend is wrongfully charged with rape and the woman
that’s charged him with rape has said she wants to get even with him?
THE WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: Objection is noted.47
The appeals court concluded that the judge’s “examination exceeded
what are generally the limits for judicial intervention in the questioning
of witnesses.”48
The court reasoned that, although the judge’s
examination was less egregious than Ragonesi, it went well beyond
clarification and caused the witness’ credibility to “unravel”; that the
unraveling was “doubly effective because jurors are likely to pick up
signs from the judge about what the judge thinks of the credibility of a
witness or a party”; and that the judge did not dull the “sting” of his
examination in his instructions to the jury.49 Taken together, the court
47. Id. at 358–59.
48. Id. at 357–58.
49. Id. at 359–60; see also Kuczynski v. Alfano, 520 N.E.2d 150, 151 (Mass. 1988)
(“The form and apparent manner [of the judge’s questions] demonstrated an insensitivity on
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concluded that the judge’s questioning was “a too partisan entry on the
side of the prosecution.”50
B. Commonwealth v. Gomes
In Commonwealth v. Gomes, the defendant appealed his convictions
on the ground that the trial judge’s questioning of a witness had resulted
in an “unnecessarily suggestive in-court identification of the defendant
as her assailant.”51 Specifically, the judge questioned the witness as
follows:
THE COURT: One question. You participated in a lineup this
morning. Did you pick anybody out of that lineup?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did. With hesitation—
THE COURT: Just [did you] pick someone out of the lineup?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I did.
THE COURT: Do you see that person here in court today?
THE WITNESS: No, I don’t.
THE COURT: Do you see the person in court here today who was
with you on the night that you described to us?
THE WITNESS: Do I see the person?
THE COURT: Can you recognize anyone in court?
THE WITNESS: Now that I see the person in front of me, I can
recognize him. I seen [sic] him walking by me in the hallway, and I
recognized him, and it came to me, but it’s because I pieced everything
together after a long time.
THE COURT: What’s your answer to my question?
THE WITNESS: Do I recognize him now?
THE COURT: Do you recognize anybody in this courtroom today
who was with you that night?

the judge’s part toward the possible effect his demeanor would have on the jury and their
deliberations.”); Commonwealth v. Hanscomb, 328 N.E.2d 880, 885 (Mass. 1975)
(Hennessey, J., concurring) (“The influence of the trial judge on the jury ‘is necessarily and
properly of great weight’ and ‘his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and
may prove controlling.’”) (quoting Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933)). For a
more comprehensive review of judicial effects on juries, see Angela M. Laughlin, Learning
from the Past? Or Destined to Repeat Past Mistakes?: Lessons from the English Legal System
and Its Impact on How We View the Role of Judges and Juries Today, 14 WIDENER L. REV.
357, 358 (2009) (“Research shows that jurors may be sensitive to a trial judge’s demeanor and
are more likely to be influenced if the judge’s demeanor suggests her view of a witness’s
credibility or of a litigant’s position.”).
50. Hassey, 668 N.E.2d at 360.
51. Commonwealth v. Gomes, 763 N.E.2d 83, 84 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002).

56

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:43

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Where is that person?
THE WITNESS: That person’s sitting right over there sitting next to
the defense attorney.52
Because the defendant had failed to object to this questioning at
trial, the Appeals Court reviewed the alleged error to determine whether
it created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.53 Under this
standard, the defendant’s claim had little chance of success.54
First, the court determined that the trial judge had committed no
error because the judge’s motive appeared to be to clarify the earlier
testimony, defense counsel had the opportunity to conduct a thorough
cross-examination of the witness, and the judge’s jury instructions
“addressed the issue of a suggestive one-on-one identification.”55
Second, the court concluded that, “[e]ven if the judge’s questioning of
the witness was error, it did not create a substantial risk of a miscarriage
of justice” because “the evidence against the defendant was
overwhelming,” and the judge’s questioning, therefore, did not
“materially influence the guilty verdict.”56 Thus, as noted above,
succeeding under a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard is
a Sisyphean task for appellate counsel.
CONCLUSION
We recognize that “[i]t is not always easy for a judge to see his duty
clearly” and that “a first-rate trial judge will find and tread the narrow
path that lies between meddlesomeness on the one hand and
ineffectiveness and impotence on the other.”57 We are also mindful of
the echo of many tried and true trial attorneys, in and out of court each

52. Id. at 84–85. This occurred after the witness had identified another individual from
the lineup as her assailant.
53. Id.
54. See Windy Rosebush, Trial Counsel’s Acts Today Could Affect a Client’s Appeal
Tomorrow: Massachusetts and New Hampshire Take Differing Positions on Appellate Review
of Unpreserved Issues, 2 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 123, 128 n.31 (1997) (noting only
five of fifty-three Massachusetts cases applying the substantial risk of miscarriage of justice
standard between 1962 and 1997 found such a risk).
55. Gomes, 763 N.E.2d at 86 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The trial court
advised the jury that in considering an identification, you “may also take into account that an
identification made by picking the defendant out of a group of similar individuals is generally
more reliable than one which results from the presentation of the defendant alone to the
witness.” Id.
56. Id.
57. HENRY T. LUMMUS, THE TRIAL JUDGE 21 (1937).
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day, that the act of objecting to a judge’s questions is a foolhardy
endeavor, especially for counsel slated to appear before the same judges
time and time again.
But the “natural reluctance” of counsel to object in the face of
improper judicial questioning is no excuse for silence.58 Counsel have
an obligation to stand up, speak up, and object when a judge’s questions
endanger their clients’ rights. This requirement is not aspirational for
trial counsel; we must ensure it is a necessity for attorneys walking into
court each day. Finally, importantly, it is time that law schools begin
training advocates not only to object to the improper questions of
opposing counsel, but also to those of judges who exceed the bounds of
what the law requires.

58.

See Commonwealth v. Fitzgerald, 406 N.E.2d 389, 395 (Mass. 1980).

